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Off-farm Income and Risky Investments:  






Can off-farm income help small farms to survive by providing a means of diversifying 
their farm household portfolios
1? The farm household structure is a complex set of inter-
relationships between and among a variety of internal and external factors involving 
consumption, investment, and income-earning activities. The importance of the farm as 
an activity included in the household portfolio will vary among households (Morehart et 
al. 2004; Mishra et al., 2002). 
 
Andersson et al. use a household portfolio model to explain the farm household investor’s 
response to an increase in off-farm income.  The risk-averse farm investor holds a 
portfolio of assets (farm and nonfarm), and may also work off-farm. We use the USDA’s 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data and a unique pseudo-panel 
dataset to examine the effect of off-farm income on the composition of risky farm 
household portfolios, by region and by farm size and typology.  In the absence of genuine 
panel data, repeated cross-sections of data across farm typologies may be used to 
construct pseudo-panel data (Deaton, Verbeek and Nijman).  A pseudo-panel is created 
by grouping individual observations such as farm and nonfarm assets, geographic 
location, or farm household wealth.  The empirical analysis is then based on the cohort 
means rather than the individual farm-level observations. 
1Henceforth “farm” refers to any place from which $1000 or more of agricultural 
products were produced and sold.  “Farm household portfolio” includes the farm and 
nonfarm assets of the household (ATOT, USDA-ARMS).   2
The adjustment processes of the agricultural sector are well studied.  However, not all 
aspects of the structural change are well understood. For example, farm households today 
receive a substantial part of their income from nonfarm sources such as wage and salary 
jobs, nonfarm businesses and services. In the U.S., for example, income from off-farm 
sources accounted for 90% of the total income for farm households in 1999 (USDA-ERS, 
Mishra et al, 2002).  Other studies documenting the importance of off-farm income are 
Fuller (1991), Huffman (1991) and Weiss (1999).  The picture remains the same if part-
time farm households are defined on the basis of time spent in farming.  In a study of off-
farm employment in Austria, Weiss (1997) estimates that on more than 50% of farms, the 
husband and wife work less than 50% of their working time on the farm. 
 
These findings may seem surprising since it is generally presumed that full-time farm 
operations are more efficient than part-time farms.  Full-time operations have the 
advantage of scale efficient technology and lower costs of credit.  This led Cochrane to 
comment, “…most [part-time farms] are going to bite the dust…cannibalized by their 
larger, aggressive, innovative neighbours” (Cochrane, 1987).  However, there is little 
evidence that this is happening.  Instead, studies indicate that mid-sized farms are 
squeezed out as the size structure of farms settles to a bi-modal distribution where farms 
are either large full-time operations or small part-time activities (Weiss, 1999). 
 
In general, off-farm work has provided a mechanism for maintaining income parity with 
other categories in the society (Gardner, 1992).  Gardner (2005) also notes that the 
integration of farm and nonfarm labor markets has slowed the overall rate of decline in 
the number of farms.  Now many people are commuting to nonfarm jobs while they   3
remain living on the farm.  Furthermore, according to Gardner, small farms are 
flourishing to an extent that no one guessed 20 or 30 years ago. Presumably, off-farm 
income has contributed to reducing the riskiness of the income stream facing the farm 
household. However, if part-time farms are less economically efficient then lower rates of 
returns on total assets should lead to their exit. Previous studies have examined 
investment behaviour of farm households but have not taken into account the riskiness of 
nonfarm assets as well as the riskiness of off-farm income (Ahituv et al., 2002) and Serra 
et al. (2004). Serra et al. find that off-farm income increases the share of non-farm 
investments while Ashituv et al. only consider farm assets without explicitly considering 
off-farm income. 
 
To what extent does off-farm income affect the investment behaviour of the farm 
household farm/non-farm assets, given that both asset categories are risky? Furthermore, 
what are the effects on investment behaviour if the magnitude and riskiness of off-farm 




The objective of this paper is to examine what determines the structure of farm household 
portfolios. To do this we apply the results derived from a theoretical model developed by 
Andersson et al. (2003). The qualitative results obtained from the model are tested 
econometrically in order to assess the impact on investment behaviour. Tests are 
performed for the shares/total investment in non-farm assets as well as in farm assets   4
owned by the farm household. Furthermore, the model allows us to assess the risk-
adjusted value to the farm household of the future income stream of off-farm income.   
 
Household portfolios serve several important objectives. First, they help finance 
retirement. Second, savings can act as household buffer stocks in both upturns and 
downturns of the economy.  Third, households can spread their portfolio risk over their 
lifetime consumption patterns through portfolio diversification and re-balancing of asset 
holdings. 
 
Two other factors have important implications for household portfolios. First, the 
presence of liquidity constraints on consumption smoothing must be considered. This 
suggests that the cost of credit (interest rate) could affect investment shares. Second, the 
greater risks borne by households are not insurable portfolio risks but uninsurable risks 
affecting their human capital. This suggests that households bearing a larger risk on their 




Consider a farm household where the spouse is employed in a part-time job.  Suppose, 
for some reason, off-farm earnings rise.  How does this affect the household’s choice of 
investments? Would it ever lead to an increase in farm investment? 
 
To examine when this might be true, we consider a portfolio choice model with labor 
income.  The household receives a stochastic stream of labor income and can invest in a   5
risk-free asset or a risky portfolio consisting of a farm asset and a nonfarm asset.  The 
correlation structure between the three risky sources of income (farm asset, nonfarm 
asset, and labor income) is unrestricted except for the assumption that the three traded 
assets span labor income. This means that there exists a combination of the traded assets 
that has the same risk characteristics as off-farm income. 
  
 Andersson et al. (2003) use a dynamic choice model rather than a static one because it 
enables them to consider wealth effects of changes in the level of labor income.   
Optimal investments can be decomposed into a tangency portfolio and a hedge portfolio.  
The tangency portfolio is the point of tangency of the borrowing-lending line with the 
mean-variance frontier and the hedge portfolio allocation is entirely due to the riskiness 
of off-farm income.  The hedge portfolio’s return provides maximum negative correlation 
with the change in off-farm income (Ingersoll, 1987, p. 282).   
 
Andersson et al. (2003) demonstrate that the total investments in risky assets, under the 
spanning assumption, is given by  
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where A(.) is the risk aversion of the indirect utility function, W  wealth, b a risk adjusted 
discount rate, Σ  a covariance matrix of returns on risky assets, Φqv is a vector of 
covariances between the growth rate of off-farm income and the returns on the risky 
assets. 
Differentiating with respect to V (off-farm income),  
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If risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, the first term is positive and higher off-farm 
income increases wealth, reduces risk aversion and thus leads to an increase in 
investments in risky assets.  The second term represents a portfolio rebalancing effect.   
As V increases, the farm household alters the hedge portfolio to reduce the risk associated 
with higher income.  It is apparent that these portfolio adjustments in general depend on 
the relative magnitude of correlations and standard deviations and their signs. 
 
Consider now the effect of off-farm income on the composition of the risky portfolio 
consisting of the farm and nonfarm asset.  It is hard to unambiguously predict the 
qualitative direction of the adjustments. One option is to examine the demand for 
individual assets such as the farm asset. The impact of off-farm income on  the demand 
for farm assets is given by  
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where  f t  is the first element of the vector t, defined as the traditional tangency portfolio. 
The first term is the wealth effect and leads to an increase in investment.  The intuition 
provided by (3) is that if Kfv is low, farm assets serve as a hedge to off-farm income and 
therefore an increase in off-farm income is associated with an increase in the investments 
in farm assets.   The second term is the portfolio re-balancing effect. Andersson (2003) 
notes that farm households would want to hold different proportions of the risky assets 
depending on the correlation of their off-farm income earnings with the returns on the 
risky assets (farm and nonfarm assets). He further shows that as off-farm income 
increases, a farm household reduces the portfolio weight of the riskier asset (p. 483). 
Hence, it is possible that even though the farm asset has a higher CV than the financial   7
asset, an increase in income increases the allocation to the farm asset if the correlation of 
off-farm income with farm returns is much less than the correlation of off-farm income 
and returns from nonfarm assets.  Therefore, an increase in off-farm income on the farm 
investments depends on the net impacts of both the wealth and re-balancing effects. We 
now describe the empirical strategy for estimating the farm household portfolio 
investment shares model.  
 
A number of studies suggest that adding high-risk financial assets with expected higher 
returns can reduce the overall risk associated with farm investments (Young and Barry, 
1987; Irwin et al., 1988; Moss et al., 1987; Crisostomo and Featherstone, 1990; Weldon, 
1988. Penson (1972) argued that investment in financial assets is an attractive means of 
diversification for many farmers. 
  
Procedure 
The investment equation given by (1) is estimated for nonfarm and farm assets using 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  Estimation is conducted in shareform following 
Hochguertel (2002), where the independent variable is farm assets divided by total assets 
(farm and nonfarm). We initially planned to use a censored two-limit Tobit estimator 
following Hochguertel (2002) but found that the two-limit Tobit did not converge 
because ARMS pseudo-panel dataset did not yield enough observations at 0 or 1. OLS 
(unlike the two-limit Tobit) does not predict any negative shares and only a few predicted 
shares were slightly greater than 1.  We also ran regressions using the change in farm 
assets/change in farm assets plus change in nonfarm assets as an alternative to estimation   8
in shareform using robust regression methods.  These regressions were not subject to the 
restriction that predicted shares be between 0 and 1.  
 
We use farm-level data from the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS). We construct a pseudo-panel dataset from pooled ARMS data for 1996-2002 
over three regions: the Lake States, the Corn Belt, and the Southeast.  These regions were 
selected to represent, respectively, production sectors dominated by wheat, corn, and 
specialty crops.  The pseudo-panel data set contains 13 cohorts per state in each year.  
Cohorts are aggregations of individual farms of similar size and characteristics and are 
tracked in each state. Explanatory variables are household and socioeconomic 
characteristics, level of wealth, nonfarm income, and other farm characteristics. The data 
enable us to measure off-farm income, and ex post returns to various asset categories 
such as farm and nonfarm assets.  
 
For empirical studies using such panel data, the temporal pattern of a given farm’s 
production behavior must be established.  In the absence of genuine panel data, we used 
repeated cross-sections of data across farm typologies to construct a pseudo panel dataset.  
We grouped the individual observations into homogeneous cohorts, distinguished 
according to time-invariant characteristics such as fixed assets, geographic location, or 
land quality.  The empirical analysis is then based on the cohort means rather than the 
individual farm-level observations. 
   9
We assigned the farm-level data to cohorts, based on the ERS farm typology (TYP) 
groups (Hoppe and MacDonald).  The typologies and cohorts are summarized in table 1.  
The data in TYP1-3 (limited resource, retirement, and residential) are relatively limited 
compared to the traditional farm data.  Therefore, they were further grouped into three 
cohorts by level of agricultural sales.  Three cohorts each were similarly defined for 
TYP4 and 6, and two each were designated for TYP5 and TYP7&8.  A cohort group is 
formed for each state in the sample.  Thus, there are 13 cohorts per state and 14 states, 
resulting in a total of 182 cross-sectional entities per year.  We will refer to these entities 
as “firms,” where “firm” is the farm household.  In general, the cohorts averaged close to 
30 observations and form a balanced panel in the Lake States and Corn Belt.  Cohorts 
with no observations occurred in the Southeast.  Thus, we estimated the equations using 
unbalanced panels. 
 
The pseudo panel data we use are the weighted mean values of the variables to be 
analyzed, by cohort, state, and year.  For example, for the Corn Belt states we have 65 
observations per year, for our 5-state sample.  To present our results below, we group 
these cohorts into (i) residential farms (RES, COH1-3); (ii) small family farms (SM, 
COH4-6); (iii) larger family farms (LG, COH7-10); and (d) very large family and non-
family farms (VLG, COH11-13). 
 
Following Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002) we analyze the shares of farm 
financial portfolios invested in risky assets (farm and nonfarm) by the farm operator   10
household-owners of these assets. Hsiao(2003) notes that the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity is the most typical concern in empirical work using panel data.  
 
Our aim is to study how nonfarm income affects the shares of farm and nonfarm assets of 
farm operator households.  We may or may not observe the value of the desired level (or 
share) of risky assets w
*
it  for each household i at time t, but we know whether farm 
households hold farm and nonfarm assets and want to study the ownership (or 
participation) probabilities Pr(w it =1) where 
w it= 1 if w
*
it > 0 or w it  = 0 if w
*
it  ≤  if short sales are not permitted. 
 
If we assume that ownership is independent over time, then ownership probabilities can 
be studied using standard cross-section discrete models.  That is, current ownership is not 
affected by past ownership.  However, there are two major reasons why ownership may 
not be independent over time.   
1.  Heterogeneity. Farm households are characterized by unobservable variables that 
affect their risk aversion and their information set and, hence, their attitudes toward 
investment in risky assets (Miniaci and Weber, 2002 and Mishra et al., 2002). 
2.  True state dependence.  Some theoretical models suggest that due to transaction costs 
and cumulated experience, current ownership depends on past ownership (Miniaci 
and Weber, 2002). 
Different assumptions regarding the presence and nature of heterogeneity and state 
dependence will affect the specification of the model, its statistical properties, and 
computational burden.   11
 
The problem when using time series and cross-sectional data is to specify a model that 
will adequately allow for differences in behaviour over time as well as for a given cross-
sectional unit.  Fixed effects regression is a method of controlling for omitted variables in 
panel data when the omitted variables vary across subjects and/or over time. (We refer to 
“firm” and/or “cohort” as “subject effects”, where “firm” is the farm household). We 
assume that unobservable individual heterogeneity is relevant but that time varying 
effects such as expectation errors are serially independent and that there is no true state 
dependence (Miniaci and Weber, pp. 148-150). We considered relaxing the assumption 
of serial independence and estimating a random effects model in which we assume that 
unobservable heterogeneity is relevant but that the it µ , the time-varying effects such as 
individual income innovations or expectation errors may be correlated. However, we ran 
the Hausman test for fixed versus random effects and rejected the random effects 
specification. 
 
We include both location and time effects to test if some omitted variables are constant 
over time but vary across regions, while other variables are constant across states but 
vary over time.  This is done by including both n – 1 subject dummy variables and T – 1 
time dummy variables in the regression, plus an intercept.  We estimate a two-way fixed 
effects model (4). We pool cohort means with the individual observations collapsed into 
the cohort means.  
 
The combined time and firm fixed effects regression model is   12
Cohort and Time fixed effects: InvShare it =  0 α   +  i α  +  t γ  +
' β it X   +  it ε               (4) 
where InvShare is the share of farm assets as a share of total assets, and X it  is a vector of 
explanatory variables including principal operator age (Age), education (Education), farm 
income (FarmIncome), nonfarm income (NonfarmIncome), wealth (Wealth), and the 
average interest rate on farm debt outstanding (CostCapital), and Wages & Salaries (later 
dropped from the model).  The model has an overall constant term as well as a group or 
cohort effect for each cohort and a time effect for each time period.  The cohort effect 
could also reflect time invariant risk aversion across cohorts (Miniaci and Weber, p 149). 
The combined time and subject fixed effects regression model accounts for omitted 
variables that vary over time and/or across subjects.  F-tests indicate that the time and 
cohort fixed effects are highly significant. 
 
The estimates from the equations shed some light on the puzzle to what extent and how 
off-farm income contributes to or mitigates structural change in agriculture. Furthermore, 
the accessible data provides an estimate of b (in (1)) that enables us to assess the present 
value of off-farm income for various farm categories. 
Farm share of investment = f (Age, Education, Wealth, FarmIncome, NonfarmIncome, 
                                                CostCapital, FarmType, RateReturnEquity) 
 
with a “Year” and “Cohort” dummy for the two-way fixed effects model). See tables 2, 3, 
and 4. 
 
We estimate the investment share equation (5) by region (table 2) and with all regions 
combined (table 3).  Tables 4 and 5 give the definitions and summary statistics for 
variables used in the regressions. Because the Andersson (2003) and the Hochguertel   13
(2002) formulations demonstrate that the effects of an increase in off-farm income on the 
investment shares vary by region and by farm size (typology), we include dummy and 
interaction variables to account for this heterogeneity. See tables 6 and 7. 
 
In developing the investment shares model, we asked two basic questions.  First, how do 
off-farm earnings affect the household’s choice of investments (farm and nonfarm)? 
Second, would an increase in off-farm earnings ever lead to an increase in farm 
investment?  
 
Age is hypothesized to have a positive impact on off-farm investment (Mishra and 
Morehart, 2001) and (Young and Barry, 1987).  Age, a proxy for constraints on 
borrowing, may disproportionately affect the young because they have few assets. 
Education is expected to have a positive effect on off-farm investment because producers 
with a higher level of education are more likely to study complex investment markets 
(Mishra and Morehart). Wealth (which includes both farm and nonfarm wealth) is 
expected to have a positive impact on off-farm investment.  It is assumed that a 
household/producer with greater equity would have more resources to invest off-farm in 
financial assets (Mishra and Morehart).  Farm households that report off-farm income are 
expected to have a higher proportion of off-farm assets. This is because many off-farm 
jobs have incentive savings options such as 401K plans that may be funded in part or 
entirely by the employer.  Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between off-farm 
income and off-farm investment.  We expect a positive relationship between the 
RateReturnEquity and off-farm investment, but perhaps less strong than the relationship   14
between wealth and off-farm investment. This is because risk-averse farm household 
investors would likely capitalize only a portion of these expected returns into farm and 
non-farm assets (wealth).  Finally, we expect a negative relationship between CostCapital 
(the average interest rate on farm debt) and investment in farm assets simply because 
higher borrowing costs, ceteris paribus, would lead to lower levels of overall investment 
in land, farm machinery, and other farm assets.  However, the overall impact of an 
increase in CostCapital would depend on how the shift in the borrowing-lending line 
with the mean-variance frontier affects the tangency portfolio and how the riskiness of 
off-farm income affects the hedge portfolio.  Therefore, we have no priors for how 
CostCapital will affect investment shares in farm versus nonfarm assets. 
 
Empirical Results    
We ran the two-way fixed effects model (4) with firm and year fixed effects. This is a 
true fixed effects (FE) model (as in Wooldridge, 2002, p. 268, eq. 10.49). We ran the 
regressions with all data merged across all regions (Lake States, Corn Belt, Northern 
Plains, and Southeast) and separately by region.  We also ran the two-way fixed model 
(4) with dummy variables for farm size (typology) and with interaction terms (FarmSize 
and NonfarmIncome and Region and NonfarmIncome).  We found that the two-way fixed 
effects model with both “year” and “firm” dummy variables better accounted for the 
heterogeneity across cohorts and over time than did the one-way fixed effects model, 
which only includes a “year” dummy variable to account for “fixed effects”.    
Two-way fixed effects:  By Region and All Regions) – Without Allowance for Outliers and 
Without Farm Size or Region Interaction Variables – With Year and Cohort Fixed Effects 
   15
Table 2 shows regression results for the investment share equation by region, without 
allowance for outliers and without any farm size or region interaction variables, but with 
year and cohort fixed effects. Age was significant in the Corn Belt and Northern Plains 
(0.05 level), and Education in the Lake States and Corn Belt (0.05). Wealth was 
significant in the Corn Belt (0.01) and in the Northern Plains (0.05). FarmIncome was 
significant in the Lake States only (0.05). NonfarmIncome was significant at the 0.01 
confidence level in the Lake States and Southeast, and at the 0.05 level in the Corn Belt.  
FarmType was significant in two regions (Lake States and Northern Plains, 0.05). 
CostCapital had the sign predicted by economic theory (negative) but also was not 
significant in all regions except for the Lake States, where it was highly significant 
(0.01).  This may be due to relatively greater share of capital-intensive farm operations 
(e.g., dairy operations) in the Lake States. RateReturnEquity was only significant (0.10) 
in the Lake States. Wages &Salaries was not significant in any region and thus was 
therefore dropped from subsequent regressions.  Year and cohort fixed effects were 
highly significant in all four regions, indicating that other farm-related variables also 
possibly affecting investment shares (such as farm size) are omitted. 
 
Table 3 shows regression results for the investment share equation for all regions. 
Overall, Education was significant (0.05) and NonfarmIncome highly significant (0.01) 
and had the expected negative sign. The negative sign indicates that the investment share 
of farm assets would fall relative to total assets (farm and nonfarm) as off-farm income 
increases.  However, farm assets could still increase absolutely, but the negative sign   16
suggests that, at the margin, investments in farm assets would rise by less than 
investments in nonfarm assets. 
 
Year and cohort fixed effects were highly significant in all four regions, again indicating 
that other farm-related variables affecting investment shares are omitted. 
 
We ran a diagnostic test for multicollinearity using SAS@ PROC REG to examine the 
variance inflation factor, or VIF.  Variance inflation is a consequence of 
multicollinearity. We found little evidence of multicollinearity.  
 
Two-way fixed effects:  By Region and All Regions) – With Allowance for Outliers 
(Robust regression) and With Farm Size and Region Interaction Variables 
 
Because we found that there were many outliers (Greene, 2003, pp. 60-61) in the input 
data, we ran SAS@’s Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) method, a robust regression method 
to adjust both those in the y-direction and also leverage points (in the x-direction). The 
SAS@ procedure we used (PROC MIXED), a maximum likelihood estimator, is not 
equivalent to the ‘true’ FE estimator (Lambert, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002) as the 
asymptotic variances differ from those of the FE estimator.) However, SAS@ PROC 
ROBUST estimates the ‘true’ FE variances. We included an interaction variable, 
NonfarmIncome*FarmSize2 (Greene, 2003, pp.123-124) where FarmSize2 includes all 
farms in Cohorts 7-13 (large farms). We found that this improved the model’s 
performance by increasing the significance of the parameter estimates and raising the 
model’s R-squared. 
   17
Table 6 shows regression results for the investment share equation for all regions using 
Robust Regression (Least Trimmed Squares). This procedure allows for outliers and also 
adds interaction variables (FarmSize and Nonfarm Income, and Region and 
NonfarmIncome), but without year and cohort fixed effects. The interaction terms allow 
for the joint effects of farm size/region and NonfarmIncome on investment shares in farm 
and nonfarm assets. 
 
Age was significant at the 10% level. Education, Wealth, FarmIncome, NonfarmIncome, 
FarmType, CostCapital, and RateReturnEquity were not significant. However, using 
FarmSize=2(cohorts 7 – 13, ‘large farms’) revealed that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the effect on nonfarm income on “share change” for small farms (cohorts 1– 
6) and large farms (cohorts 7-13) (table 6). 
 
Table 7 shows regression results for the investment share equation for all regions again 
using Robust Regression (Least Trimmed Squares). This time we added Region and 
Nonfarm Income interaction variables to allow for the joint effects of region and 
NonfarmIncome on investment shares. 
 
None of the independent variables was statistically significant. However, using 
Region=6(Southeast) revealed that although there is no statistically significant different 
in the effect of nonfarm income on investment shares between the Lake States, Corn Belt, 
and the Southeast, there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of nonfarm 
income on “share change” in the Northern Plains and the Southeast. 
   18
Summary and Conclusions 
This study represents an initial effort at testing the theoretical relationships regarding the 
effect of nonfarm income on investments in farm and nonfarm assets.  We used OLS and 
pseudo-panel data from the USDA’s ARMS survey to examine how off-farm income 
affects the shares of farm/non-farm assets given that both asset categories are risky. 
(Furthermore, what are the effects on investment behaviour if the magnitude and 
riskiness of off-farm income are taken into account?). 
 
These results generally agree with other studies that have used farm-level data to 
empirically assess the impacts of off-farm income on farm and nonfarm investments.  
Our econometric estimation using OLS with pseudo-panel data suggests that, as expected 
and consistent with economic theory, off-farm income affects the investor’s portfolio 
allocation between farm and nonfarm assets.  We suggest several implications of these 
results. 
 
First, the impacts of changes in off-farm income on investment in farm versus nonfarm 
assets vary widely by farm type, farm size, location, and by other factors.  Across these 
four regions, Age and NonfarmIncome were the most significant factors affecting the 
farm-nonfarm investments shares.  We also found, as expected, the farm heterogeneity 
affects investment shares. Since the two-way fixed effects estimation shows that other 
farm-related variables possibly affecting investment shares are very significant, we 
introduced dummy variables and interaction variables to help account for these affects.   19
We found that both region and farm size (large vs. small farms) significantly affect 
investment shares. 
 
Second, changes in shares of funds invested in farm versus nonfarm capital affects the 
distribution of wealth by farm type, farm size, and location (Blank et al., 2004).  In 
general, the fact that changes in nonfarm capital have larger impacts than do changes in 
farm capital across all regions implies that there are economic incentives to shift 
resources out of agriculture. To the extent that additional off-farm income leads risk-
averse farm household investors to hold relatively larger shares of nonfarm versus farm 
assets, there are economic incentives to shift resources out of agriculture.  However, 
Blank et al. note that this may not happen because there appear to be incentives for small-
scale farms to increase their capital levels (Blank et al., p. 1306). 
 
There are several others paths we plan to pursue. First, we will further examine the 
correlations of off-farm income with farm and nonfarm income since this affects the 
investor’s portfolio allocation through their impacts on Kfv . We believe that Kfv may vary 
across regions (e.g., Eastern vs. Western Corn Belt) reflecting differing risk preferences, 
commodity mixes, and other factors contributing to firm heterogeneity.  Second, we will 
more specifically account for the riskiness of nonfarm assets as well as for the riskiness 
of off-farm income. Ahituv et al. (2002) and Serra et al. (2004) found that these factors 
can significantly affect investment shares in farm and nonfarm assets. Third, we will 
consider alternative model formulations, including one that more directly relates operator 
capital expenditures to the subsequent investment shares allocation between farm and   20
nonfarm assets.   Fourth, we will later develop a dynamic model that will better reflect 
‘state dependence’ since investment decisions are linked intertemporally. 
 
In subsequent analysis we will pool the ARMS data at the farm-level (rather than using 
pooled cohort data) and then estimate the equations using a censored two-limit Tobit. 
Using farm-level data rather than averaged means (pseudo-panel data) will yield 
sufficient investment shares in the 0 to 1 range so that the two-limit Tobit will converge. 
We will also use a richer dataset with risks and returns on nonfarm assets varying by state 
and over time, more regions, and a longer time frame. We will parameterize the model as 
in (4.3) and (4.5), including a dynamic model with more complete allowance for firm 
heterogeneity and state dependency (following Hochguertel et al. in Chapters 4 and 9 of 
Household Portfolios).   
 
The effect of additional nonfarm income on the farm operator’s investment behaviour 
under risk depends on a number of factors, including risk preferences, level of 
diversification of farm production (Mishra and Goodwin; McNamara and Weiss), and on 
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Table 1.  The Farm Typology Groups and Cohort Definitions 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Typology    USDA definition  Sales ($) 
TYP1    Limited resource  <100,000 (assets <150,000, 
income < 20,000) 
TYP2   Retirement  <250,000 
TYP3    Residential (other major occupation)  <250,000  
TYP4    Farm/lower sales   <100,000 
TYP5    Farm/higher sales  <250,000  
TYP6    Large family farms  250,000-499,999  
TYP7    Very large farms  500,000+  
      
Cohort    Typology  Gross Value of Sales 
COH1   TYP1-3  <2,499 
COH2   TYP1-3  2,500-29,999 
COH3   TYP1-3  >30,000 
COH4   TYP4  <10,000 
COH5   TYP4  10,000-29,999 
COH6   TYP4  30,000-99,999 
COH7   TYP5  100,000-174,999 
COH8   TYP5  175,000-249,999 
COH9    TYP6   250,000-329,999 
COH10    TYP6 330-000-409,999 
 COH11    TYP6 >500,000 
COH12    TYP7 <1000,000 
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Table 2. Regression Results for Investment Share Equation by Region:  
Lake States, Corn Belt, and Southeast (1996-2002) - (two-way fixed effects) 
Investment Share equation  








Variable  Estimate  t value  Estimate  t value  Estimate t value  Estimate t value 
            
Age -0.0010  -0.85  0.001513  1.96*  0.004022 2.31**  -0.00143  -1.39 
Education  -0.05021 -3.11*** -0.02741  -2.71*** -0.00002 -0.00  -0.01244 -1.11 
Wealth  -0.00001 -0.76  -0.00004  -2.73*** -0.00008 -2.29** 9.511E-6 -1.11 
NonfarmIncome  -0.00142 -3.25*** -0.00038  -2.00**  -0.00036 -0.73  -0.00105 -3.42*** 
FarmIncome 0.000148  2.00**  -0.00010  -1.47  0.000176 1.32  -0.00004  -0.44 
FarmType 
1=crop, 2=livestock 
0.0674 2.35** 0.01810 0.90  0.09499  2.57**  -0.01164  -0.48 
CostCapital And an 
inn in June and the  
-0.00096 -4.35*** 0.000133  0.84  -0.00015 -0.23  -0.00004 -0.38 
RateReturnEquity  -0.00282 -1.82*  -9.62E-6  -0.01  -0.00257 -1.17  0.000357 0.35 
Wages & Salaries
1  0.00919 1.51  -0.00005  -0.17  -0.00090  -1.24  0.000667 1.26 
            
Fixed Effects            
Year:   ***    ***   ***   *** 
Cohort:   ***    ***   ***   *** 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 confidence levels.  
NS denotes “not significant.” 
1 Since Wages & Salaries is included in NonfarmIncome and was NS, NonfarmIncome 
was not included in tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 3. Regression Results for Investment Share Equation:  
All Regions (1996-2002) – 
  (two-way fixed effects) 
Investment Share equation  
All Regions  
Variable  Estimate t  value 
    
Age 0.000168  0.32 
Education -0.02019  -3.10*** 
Wealth -3.01E-6  -0.51 
NonfarmIncome -0.00073  -4.92*** 




CostCapital -0.00008  -1.02 
RateReturnEquity -0.00038  -0.71 
Wages & Salaries
1  0.000160 0.70 
    
Fixed Effects    
Year:   *** 
Cohort:   *** 
    
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 confidence levels.  
NS denotes “not significant.” 
1 Since Wages & Salaries is included in NonfarmIncome and was NS, NonfarmIncome 
was not included in tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Regressions:  




























Variable  Description  Mean  Mean Mean Mean Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
  Lake States: 
MI, MN, WI 
Corn Belt: IL, IN, 








AL, FL, GA, SC 
Independent variable 
Actual_Share  Actual share of 
farm assets as 
share of total 
(farm + 
nonfarm) 
0.7987  0.9187 0.7945 0.9232 0.7728  0.9303  0.7857  0.9051 
Operator/Household Characteristics: 
Age    55.06  48.35 55.76 49.50 56.12  50.79  57.66  51.24 




both farm and 
nonfarm net 
worth, $000s) 
424.72  980.91 419.84 918.79 385.38  877.67  602.55  1014.00 
Farm Characteristics: 
FarmIncome Farm  income 
($000s) 
4.40 127.82  6.32  91.51 3.91 100.31  4.24 72.46 
NonFarmIncome Nonfarm  income 
($000s) 
46.87  24.68 47.43 34.00 48.23  27.92  55.46  30.61 
CostCapital Average  interest 




10.37  11.21 13.65 9.97  13.09  9.57 11.17  19.11 
FarmType 1=crop; 
2=livestock 
1.43  1.54 1.45 3.05 1.43  1.39  1.61  1.40 
RateReturnEquity  Rate of return on 
farm  equity 
-4.46  2.48 -3.34  3.05 -4.95  1.56  -2.88  1.53 
1 Small farms are defined as farms in cohorts 1-6 (farm typologies 1 through 4). 
2Large farms are defined as farms in cohorts 7-13 (farm typologies 5 through 7). 
   
Source: USDA, Agricultural Resource Management Survey. 
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Table 5. Definitions and Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Used in Regressions: All Regions, Means and Standard Deviations 
  
 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
  All Regions: Lake States, Corn Belt, 
Northern Plains, Southeast 
 
Actual_Share  Actual share of farm assets as share 
of total (farm + nonfarm) 
0.86 0.12 
Age  Age of principal operator  52.83  6.85 
Education  Education of principal operator  2.59  0.48 
HH_NETW  Farm household’s net worth 
(includes both farm and nonfarm 
net worth, $000s) 
729.09 622.04 
FarmIncome  Farm income ($000s)  53.49  131.23 
NonFarmIncome  Nonfarm income ($000s)  39.19  29.85 
CostCapital  Average interest rate on farm 
business debt outstanding (percent) 
12.48 32.37 
FarmType 1=crop;  2=livestock  1.44  0.28 
RateReturnEquity  Rate of return on farm  equity  -0.47  7.83 
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Table 6. Robust Regression (Least Trimmed Squares) Results for 
 Investment Share Equation and Interaction of FarmSize and NonfarmIncome
1: 
All Regions (1996-2002) – using FarmSize=2(cohorts 7-13, large farms) 
 as the reference category 
   
Investment Share equation – Using “share_change”
1 
All Regions  
Variable  Estimate Chi-Square 
    
Age -0.0042  4.51* 
Education 0.0074  0.07 
Wealth 0.0000  3.26 
NonfarmIncome
2  0.0007 1.35 




CostCapital -0.0001  0.02 
RateReturnEquity -0.0010  0.20 
NonfarmIncome_FarmSize1
3  -0.0033 32.29 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 confidence levels.  
NS denotes “not significant.” 
1 FarmSize=2 (cohorts 7-13) is the reference category for the interaction of FarmSize and 
NonfarmIncome. 
2 Coefficient for LargeFarms (cohorts 7-13). 
3 Coefficient for small farms = 0.0007 – 0.0033 = -0.0026. The Chi-Square statistics for 
NonfarmIncome_FarmSize1 (the interaction of FarmSize and NonfarmIncome) suggests 
that there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of NonfarmIncome on “share 
change” for small (cohorts 1-6) and large farms (cohorts 7-13). 
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Table 7. Robust Regression (Least Trimmed Squares) Results for 
 Investment Share Equation and Interaction of Region and NonfarmIncome
1: 
All Regions (1996-2002) – using Southeast (RegCode=6) as reference category 
   




Variable  Estimate Chi-Square 
    
Age -0.0068  10.74 
Education 0.0199  0.44 
Wealth 0.0001  9.82 
NonfarmIncome
3  -0.0017 7.58 




CostCapital -0.0001  0.05 
RateReturnEquity -0.0006  0.06 
NonfarmIncome_Region2
4  -0.0003 0.10 
NonfarmIncome_Region3 -0.0007  1.29 
NonfarmIncome_Region4
5  -0.0022 5.55** 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 confidence levels.  
NS denotes “not significant.” 
1”Share_Change” (from previous year) = (change in farm assets)/(change in farm assets + 
change in nonfarm assets) 
2 Region2 = Lake States, Region3 = Corn Belt, Region 4=Northern Plains, and 
Region6=Southeast. Region6 (Southeast) is the reference category for the interaction of 
Region and NonfarmIncome. 
3Coefficient for Region6 (Southeast). 
4 Coefficient for Region2 (Lake States) is (-0.0017) - (-0.0003); no significant change 
from Region6 (Southeast). 
5 Only Region4 (Northern Plains) is statistically different from Region6 (Southeast). 














   32
 